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Abstract
The paper discusses the role of memory in an asset pricing model with heterogeneous 
beliefs. In particular, we were interested in how memory in the fitness measure affects the 
stability of evolutionary adaptive systems and the survival of technical trading. In order to 
obtain an insight into this matter, two cases were analyzed: a two-type case of fundamen-
talists versus contrarians and a three-type case of fundamentalists versus opposite biases. 
It has been established that increasing memory strength has a stabilizing effect on dyna-
mics, though it is not able to eliminate speculative traders’ short-run profit-seeking beha-
viour from the market. Furthermore, opposite biases do not seem to lead to chaotic dyna-
mics, even when there are no costs for fundamentalists. Apparently some (strong) trend 
extrapolator beliefs are needed in order to trigger chaotic asset price fluctuations.
Key Words: asset pricing, biased beliefs, contrarians, fitness measure, fundamenta-
lists, heterogeneous beliefs, memory strength, stability
1 Introduction
Heterogeneous agent models are present in various fields of economic analysis, such 
as market maker models, exchange rate models, monetary policy models, overlapping ge-
nerations models and models of socio-economic behaviour. Yet the field with the most 
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systematic and perhaps most promising nonlinear dynamic approach seems to be asset 
price modelling. Contributions by Brock and Hommes (1998), LeBaron (2000), Hom-
mes et al. (2002), Chiarella and He (2002), Chiarella et al. (2003), Gaunersdorfer et al. 
(2003), Brock et al. (2005), Hommes et al. (2005), and Hommes (2006) thoroughly de-
monstrate how a simple standard pricing model is able to lead to complex dynamics that 
makes it extremely hard to predict the evolution of prices in asset markets. The main fra-
mework of analysis of such asset pricing models constitutes a financial market applicati-
on for the evolutionary selection of expectation rules, introduced by Brock and Hommes 
(1997a) and is called the adaptive belief system.
As a model in which different agents have the ability to switch beliefs, the adaptive 
belief system in a standard discounted value asset pricing set-up is derived from mean-va-
riance maximization and extended to the case of heterogeneous beliefs (Hommes, 2006, p. 
47). It can be formulated in terms of deviations from a benchmark fundamental and there-
fore used in experimental and empirical testing of deviations from the rational expectati-
ons benchmark. Agents are boundedly rational, act independently of each other and select 
a forecasting or investment strategy based upon its recent relative performance. The key 
feature of such systems, which often incorporate active learning and adaptation, is endo-
genous heterogeneity (cf. LeBaron, 2002), which means that markets can move through 
periods that support a diverse population of beliefs, and others in which these beliefs and 
strategies might collapse down to a very small set.
The mixture of different trader types leads to diverse dynamics exhibiting some styli-
zed, qualitative features observed in practice on financial markets (cf. Campbell et al., 
1997; Johnson et al., 2003), e.g. persistence in asset prices, unpredictability of returns at 
daily horizon, mean reversion at long horizons, excess volatility, clustered volatility, and 
leptokurtosis of asset returns. An important finding so far was that irregular and chaotic 
behaviour is caused by rational choice of prediction strategies in the bounded-rationali-
ty framework, and that this also exhibits quantitative features of asset price fluctuations, 
observed in financial markets. Namely, due to differences in beliefs these models gene-
rate a high and persistent trading volume, which is in sharp contrast to no trade theorems 
in rational expectations models. Fractions of different trading strategies fluctuate over 
time and simple technical trading rules can survive evolutionary competition. On avera-
ge, technical analysts may even earn profits comparable to the profits earned by funda-
mentalists or value traders. 
While recent literature on asset price modelling focuses mainly on impacts of hetero-
geneity of beliefs in the standard adaptive belief system as set up by Brock and Hommes 
(1997a) on market dynamics and stability on one hand, and the possibility of the survival 
of such ‘irrational’ and speculative traders in the market on the other, several crucial issu-
es regarding the foundations of asset price modelling and its underlying theoretical findin-
gs remain open and indeterminate. One of those issues is related to heterogeneity in inve-
stors’ time horizon; both their planning and their evaluation perspective. Namely, it has 
been scarcely addressed so far how memory in the fitness measure, i.e. the share of past 
information that boundedly rational economic agents take into account as decision makers, 
affects stability of evolutionary adaptive systems and survival of technical trading.197
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LeBaron (2002) was using simulated agent-based financial markets of individuals 
following relatively simple behavioural rules that are updated over time. Actually, time 
was an essential and critical feature of the model. It has been argued that someone beli-
eving that the world is stationary should use all available information in forming his or 
her beliefs, while if one views the world as constantly in a state of change, then it will be 
better to use time series reaching a shorter length into the past. The dilemma is thus seen 
as an evolutionary challenge where long-memory agents, using lots of past data, are pi-
tted against short-memory agents to see who takes over the market. Agents with a short-
term perspective appear to both influence the market in terms of increasing volatility and 
create an evolutionary space where they are able to prosper. Changing the population to 
more long-memory types has led to a reliable convergence in strategies. Memory or per-
haps the lack of it therefore appeared to be an important aspect of the market that is likely 
to keep it from converging and prevent the elimination of ‘irrational’, speculative strate-
gies from the market.
Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) provided basic analytical results for dynamics of adap-
tive learning when the learning rule had finite memory and the presence of random shocks 
precluded exact convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium. The authors focu-
sed on the case of learning a stochastic steady state. Even though their work is not done in 
the heterogeneous agent setting, the results they obtained are interesting for our analysis. 
Their fundamental outcome was that the expectational stability principle, which plays a 
central role in situations of complete learning, as discussed e.g. in Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001), retains its importance in the analysis of incomplete learning, though it takes a 
new form. In the models that were analyzed, expectational stability guaranteed stationary 
dynamics in the learning economy and unbiased forecasts.
Chiarella et al. (2006) proposed a dynamic financial market model in which demand 
for traded assets had both a fundamentalist and a chartist component in the boundedly ra-
tional framework. The chartist demand was governed by the difference between current 
price and a (long-run) moving average. By examining the price dynamics of the moving 
average rule they found out that an increase of the window length of the moving average 
rule can destabilize an otherwise stable system, leading to more complicated, even cha-
otic behaviour. The analysis of the corresponding stochastic model was able to explain 
various market price phenomena, including temporary bubbles, sudden market crashes, 
price resistance and price switching between different levels. 
The objective of this paper is to lay the foundations for a competent and critical the-
oretical analysis setting the memory assumption in a simple, analytically tractable asset 
pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs. We shall thus analyze the effects of additional 
memory in the fitness measure on evolutionary adaptive systems and the nature of con-
sequences for survival of technical trading. In order to examine our research hypothesis 
adequately, both analytical and numerical analysis will have to be employed and comple-
mented. Therefore, we shall first expand the asset pricing model to include more memory, 
and then solve it both analytically and numerically. Two cases are going to be analyzed, 
hopefully sufficiently general to cover some main aspects of financial markets; (1) a two-
type case of fundamentalists versus contrarians and (2) a three-type case of fundamentali-
sts versus opposite biased beliefs. Complementing the stability analysis with local bifur-198
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cation theory, we will also be able to analyze numerically the effects of adding different 
amounts of additional memory to fitness measure on stability of the standard asset pricing 
model and survival of technical trading. Thus the analysis of both local and global stabili-
ty can be performed for different combinations of trader types in the market.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Chapter 2 an asset pricing model with he-
terogeneous beliefs with endogenous evolutionary switching of strategies is presented, 
forming the groundwork for analysis of economic fluctuations and the underlying rules 
relating to the formation of expectations. In so doing, the role of memory in the fitne-
ss measure and possible consequences for the outcomes of such models are stressed. In 
Chapters 3 and 4 the two aforementioned cases are examined both analytically and nu-
merically; the main results regarding effects of the different types of market traders on 
market stability are presented, together with effects of changing memory on market mo-
vements of different economic categories. In the final chapter the essential findings of 
the paper are summarized.
2 The Heterogeneous Agents Model
The adaptive belief system employs a mechanism dealing with interaction between 
fractions of market traders of different types, and the distance between the fundamental 
and the actual price. Financial markets are thus viewed as an evolutionary system, where 
price fluctuations are driven by an evolutionary dynamics between different expectati-
on schemes. Pioneering work in this field has been done by Brock and Hommes (1997a), 
who attempted to conciliate the two main perspectives concerning economic fluctuations, 
i.e. the new classical and the Keynesian view (cf. Hommes, 2006, pp. 1-5), and the un-
derlying rules relating to the formation of expectations. In order to get some insight into 
possible ways of theoretical analysis to follow, we shall describe a simple, analytically 
tractable version of the asset pricing model as constructed by Brock and Hommes (1998). 
The model can be viewed as composed of two simultaneous parts; present value asset pri-
cing and the evolutionary selection of strategies, resulting in equilibrium pricing equati-
on and fractions of belief types equation. We shall also make an indication of where me-
mory in the fitness measure (and in expectation rules) enters the model and how it might 
affect the analysis.
2.1 Present Value Asset Pricing
The model incorporates one risky asset and one risk free asset. The latter is perfectly 
elastically supplied at given gross return R, where R = 1 + r. Investors of different types 
h have different beliefs about the conditional expectation and the conditional variance of 
modelling variables based on a publicly available information set consisting of past pri-
ces and dividends. The present value asset pricing part of the adaptive demand system is 
used to model each investor type as a myopic mean variance maximizer of expected we-
alth demand, Eh,tWt, for the risky asset:
, (1)199
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where pt is the price (ex dividend) at time t per share of risky asset, yt is an IID dividend 
process at time t of the risky asset, zh,t is number of shares purchased at date t by agent of 
type h, and   is the excess return. In order to perform myopic mean 
variance maximization of expected wealth demand for risky asset of type h, we seek for 








where the belief about expected value of wealth at time t + 1, conditional on all publicly 
available information at time t, for a trader of type h is Eh,tWt+1, the belief about conditi-
onal variance is, and there is a risk factor  present  . Beliefs about the conditio-
nal variance of excess return are assumed to be constant and the same for all types of in-
vestors, i.e. Vh,t = σ2. All traders are assumed to be equally risk averse with a given risk 
aversion parameter a, which is constant over time.2 
Solving this optimization problem produces quantities of shares purchased by agents of 
different types, which enables us to seek for the equilibrium between the constant supply 




where the fraction of traders of type h out of altogether H types at time t is denoted by nh,t, 
where  . The price of the risky asset is determined by market clearing, which 




where aσ2zs is the risk premium. The latter is an extra amount of money that traders get 
for holding the risky asset. Traders will only purchase the risky asset if its expected value 
is equal or higher than the expected value of the risk-free asset. Since the outcome of the 
risky asset is uncertain, a risk premium is associated with it
2 Gaunersdorfer (2000) investigated the case of time varying variance and supported the assumption of a con-
stant and homogeneous variance term.200
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In the simplest case of IID dividends with mean  and with traders having correct be-





where a noise term εt is included, which represents random fluctuations in the supply of 
risky shares. Considering a special case with a constant zero supply of outside shares, i.e. 
zs = 0, we obtain: 
. 
If we instead consider for a moment the case of homogeneous beliefs with no noise 
and all traders being rational, the pricing equation simplifies to:
.  (7)
In equilibrium the expectations of the price will be the same and equal to the funda-
mental price. The constant fundamental value of the price of the risky asset p* in the case 
of homogeneous beliefs is derived from the expression:
.    (8)
By imposing a transversality condition on expression (7) with infinitely many soluti-
ons we exclude bubble solutions (cf. Cuthbertson, 1996) and expression (8) now has only 





By simplification of the fundamental price equation for the case of the IID dividend 
process with constant conditional expectation we thus obtain the standard benchmark no-
tion of the ‘fundamental’, i.e.  , to be used in the model hereinafter.
Taking into account the appropriate form of heterogeneous beliefs of future prices, 
i.e. including some deterministic function fh,t, which can differ across trader types:
, 201
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we restrict beliefs about the next deviation of the actual from the fundamental price, xt, to 
deterministic functions of past deviations from the fundamental:
,  (10)
where L is the number of lags of past information, taken into account. Since the determi-
nistic function in the expectation rule depends on preceding price deviations, it can also 
be seen as including memory. However, due to rapidly increasing analytical complexi-
ty, viz. including more preceding price deviations rapidly increases the dimension of the 
system, this issue has so far mainly been neglected. In this paper we are focusing on the 
memory in the fitness measure and will thus include only one lag in the memory in the 
expectation rule, i.e. fh (xt-1). 
Taking into account that,  , the equilibrium pricing equation (5) can thus fi-




The particular form of deterministic function in the forecasting or expectation rule 
is thus what determines different types of heterogeneous agents in an adaptive belief sy-
stem. In general, we distinguish between two typical investor types; fundamentalists and 
‘noise traders’ or technical analysts. Fundamentalists believe that the price of an asset is 
defined solely by its efficient market hypothesis fundamental value (Fama, 1991), i.e. the 
present value of the stream of future dividends. Since they have no knowledge about other 
beliefs and fractions, fh,t ≡ 0. Actual financial data show that fundamentalists have a sta-
bilizing effect on prices (De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006). 
Technical analysts or chartists, on the other hand, believe that asset prices are not 
completely determined by fundamentals, but may be predicted by inferences on past pri-
ces. Depending on the purpose of analysis, it is possible to distinguish between (pure) 
trend chasers with expectation rule fh,t = gh xt-1; gh > 0, (pure) contrarians with expectati-
on rule fh,t = gh xt-1; gh < 0, and (pure) biased beliefs with expectation rule fh,t = bh, where 
gh is the trend and bh is the bias (difference between p* and trader’s belief of p*) of the 
trader of type h. 
2.2 Evolutionary Selection of Strategies
In order to be able to understand the dynamics of fractions of different trader types, 
we consider the appropriate formulations of realized excess return Rt from expression (1), 
and demand of different types of market traders, zh,t-1, defined by expression (3). 
Taking again into account the nature of the dividend process   with constant 
conditional expectation,  , and assumed distribution  , we are 202
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thus able to formulate profits for a particular type of traders in each period as the product 
of realized excess return and number of shares purchased by traders of that type: 
,  (12)
where Ch represents the costs traders have to pay to use strategy h. Albeit introducing ad-
ditional analytical complexity, we usually take into account the costs for predictor of par-
ticular trader type, since more information-intense predictors are evidently more costly. 
It is of course convenient to rewrite profits of different types of traders in terms of devi-
ations from the benchmark fundamental: 
.  (13)
The fitness function or performance measure of each trader type can now be defined 
in terms of its realized profits. In fact, it can be expressed as the weighted sum of reali-
zed profits, i.e. as the sum of current realized profits and a share of past fitness, which is 
in turn defined as past realized profits:
,  (14)
where current realized profits are defined in the following final form: 
.  (15)
The fitness function can for Uh,0 = 0 also be rewritten in the following expanded form 
with exponentially declining weights: 
. 
In case of the equilibrium pricing equation, herein formulated as the sum over trader 
types of products of a fraction of particular trader type and its deterministic function, the 
fitnesses enter the adaptive belief system before the equilibrium price is observed. This 
is suitable for analyzing the asset pricing model as an explicit nonlinear difference equa-
tion. Even though nonlinear asset pricing dynamics can be modelled either as a determi-
nistic or a stochastic process, only the latter enables investigation of the effects of noise 
upon the asset pricing dynamics. 
The share of past fitness in the performance measure is expressed by the parameter 
w; 0 ≤ w ≤ 1, called memory strength. When the value of this parameter is zero (w = 0), 
the fitness is given by most recent net realized profit. Due to analytical tractability this is 
at present, y for the most part, the case in the existing literature on asset pricing models 
with heterogeneous agents, though not in this paper. The main contribution of this paper 
is that it analyzes the case of nonzero memory in the fitness measure. When the memory 
strength parameter takes a positive value, some share of current realized profits in any 203
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given period is taken into account when calculating the performance measure in the next 
time period. If the value of memory strength parameter amounts to one then of course the 
entire accumulated wealth is taken into account. 
The expression (14) for the fitness function is somewhat different that the one used 
in Brock and Hommes (1998), where the coefficient of the current realized profits was 
fixed to 1. Namely, if we rewrite the memory strength parameter as,  , where T 
is considered to be a specific number of time periods, we obtain the following expressi-




which is equivalent to taking the last T observations into account with equal weight (as 
benchmark). When T approaches infinity, the memory parameter approaches 1 and the 
entire accumulated wealth is taken into account. We thus believe the expression (14) to 
be a more suitable formulation of the fitness measure than the one used in Brock and Ho-
mmes (1998), and in several other contributions.
Finally, we can express fractions of belief types, nh,t, which are updated in each period, as 




by using parameter β, determining the intensity of choice. The latter measures how fast 
economic agents switch between different prediction strategies; if the value of intensity 
of choice is zero, then all trader types have equal weight and the mass of traders distri-
butes itself evenly across the set of available strategies, while on the other hand the enti-
re mass of traders tends to use the best predictor, i.e. the strategy with the highest fitness, 
when the intensity of choice approaches infinity (the neoclassical limit).
Trader fractions are therefore determined by fitness and intensity of choice. Rationa-
lity in the asset pricing model is evidently bounded, since fractions are ranked according 
to fitness, but not all agents choose the best predictor. To ensure that fractions of belief 
types depend only upon observable deviations from the fundamental at any given time 
period, fitness function in the fractions of belief types equation may only depend on past 
fitness and past return. This indeed ensures that past realized profits are observable quan-
tities that can be used in predictor selection. 
One might wonder whether the traders’ myopic mean-variance maximization is a re-
asonable assumption, especially when we allow for traders with a longer memory span. 
This assumption is widely used in modelling in economics and finance, though it would 
certainly be interesting to let traders plan longer ahead, even with an infinite planning 
horizon, as in the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model. However, in this kind of model one 204
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usually assumes perfect rationality to keep the analysis tractable. So far very little work 
has been done on infinite horizon models with bounded rationality and heterogeneous be-
liefs. Furthermore, one can also discuss whether individuals are really able to plan over a 
long horizon, or whether they might use simple heuristics over a short horizon and occa-
sionally adapt them. After all, memory in the fitness measure is not equivalent to the pla-
nning horizon, but rather an “evaluation horizon” used to decide whether or not to switch 
strategies. There is empirical and experimental evidence that humans give more weight 
to the recent past than the far distant past, and this is formalized in our model. 
3 Fundamentalists versus Contrarians
The first case we are going to examine is a two-type heterogeneous agents model 
with fundamentalists and contrarians as market participants. Fundamentalists exhibit de-
terministic function of the form:
f1,t ≡ 0  (18)
and have some positive information gathering costs C, i.e. C > 0. Contrarians exhibit a 
deterministic function: 
f2,t = gxt-1; g < 0  (19)
and zero information gathering costs. It is thus a case of fundamentalists versus pure con-








Finally, we have the fitness measure equation of each type:
,  (22)
.  (23)
In order to analyze memory in our heterogeneous asset pricing model, we shall first 
determine the position and stability of the steady state and the period two-cycle in relation 
to the memory strength parameter. We will also examine the possible qualitative changes 
in dynamics. Then we will perform some numerical simulations to combine global stabi-
lity analysis with local stability analysis. 205
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3.1 Position of the Steady State
In our two-type heterogeneous agents model of fundamentalists versus contrarians 




where n1,t – n2,t = mt and n1,t + n2,t = 1 and. The difference in fractions of belief types equ-




A steady state price deviation x is a fixed point of the system, if it satisfies x = f(x) 





where either xeq = 0 or  , and thus  . In the former case we get the 
fundamental steady state, where the price is equal to its fundamental value and the diffe-
rence in fractions is: 
.
 
Since it follows from expressions (22) and (23) that   and   








Since it can be derived that   and 
we finally obtain:
. (29)
Therefore we can state the following lemma.206
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Lemma 1: The fundamental steady state in case of fundamentalists versus contra-
rians is a unique steady state of the system. Memory does not affect the position of this 
steady state.
3.2 Stability of the Steady State 
In order to analyze stability of the steady state we shall rewrite our system as a dif-
ference equation: 
Xt = F1 (Xt–1), (30)
where
 
 is a vector of new variables, which are defi-
ned as:    and   .
We therefore obtain the following 5-dimensional first-order difference equation: 
, (31)
x2,t = xt–1 = x1,t–1, (32)
x3,t = xt–2 = x2,t–1, (33)
, (34)
.  (35)
The local stability of a steady state is determined by the eigenvalues of the Jacobian 
matrix, which we do not present here due to the spatial limitations of the article. We then 
compute the Jacobian matrix of the 5-dimensional map. At the fundamental steady state 
Xeq = (0, 0, 0, – C, 0) we obtain the new Jacobian matrix. A straightforward computation 
shows that the characteristic equation is in our case given by: 
 (36)
with solutions (eigenvalues): 
 
and  . The steady state Xeq 
is stable for; |λ| < 1; therefore in cases   and  .
Thus we can state the following lemma. 207
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Lemma 2: The fundamental steady state in case of fundamentalists versus contra-
rians is globally stable for –R < g < 0. Memory does not affect the stability of this ste-
ady state.
3.3 Bifurcations and the Period Two-cycle 
A bifurcation is a qualitative change of the dynamical behaviour that occurs when pa-
rameters are varied (Brock and Hommes, 1998). A specific type of bifurcation that occurs 
when one parameter is varied is called a co-dimension one bifurcation. There are several 
types of such bifurcations, viz. period doubling, saddle-node and Hopf bifurcations. The 
first type has eigenvalue –1 of the Jacobian matrix, the second type has eigenvalue 1 and 
the third type has complex eigenvalues on the unit circle.
If we take a look at the eigenvalue λ1, which we are in our case interested in, we can 
observe that a saddle-node bifurcation can never occur. Namely, the expression: 
 
(37)
can never hold, since the left-hand side is a positive constant and the right-hand side is 
always negative for g < 0, R > 0 and  . On the other hand, the expression: 
 (38)
may be satisfied for  , since both sides of the expression are then negative. Thus 
a (primary) period doubling bifurcation may occur in our model for the following β-
value:
. (39)
which has been computed by plugging   into expression (38), and 
solving for the memory strength parameter β.
Now we can check the existence of a period two-cycle. {(x*, m*), (- x*, m*)} Taking 
into account that U1 * = kRx*2 (1+R) – C and U2 * = kx*2 (1+R) (g+R), a period two-cycle 
occurs when
 
, and thus   satisfies:
. (40)
Therefore we can state the following lemma. 208
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Lemma 3: In case of fundamentalists versus contrarians the fundamental steady state 
(0, meq) is unstable for g < –2R and there exists a period two-cycle {(x*, m*), (- x*, m*)}. 
For –2R < g < –R there are two possibilities: 
(1) if
 
, then (0, meq) is the unique, globally stable steady state, 
while 
(2) if  , then the steady state (0, meq) is unstable and there exists a 
period two-cycle {(x*, m*), (- x*, m*)}. Memory does not affect the position of the peri-
od two-cycle.
As in the paper of Brock and Hommes (1998), very strong contrarians with g < –2R 
may lead to the existence of a period two-cycle, even when there are no costs for funda-
mentalists (C = 0). When the fundamentalists’ costs are positive (C > 0), strong contrari-
ans with –2R < g < –R may lead to a period two-cycle. As the intensity of choice increa-
ses to β = β*, a period doubling bifurcation occurs in which the fundamental steady state 
becomes unstable and a (stable) period two-cycle is created, with one point above and the 
other one below the fundamental. 
When the intensity of choice further increases, we are likely to find a value β = β**, 
for which the period two-cycle becomes unstable and a Hopf bifurcation of this period 
two-cycle occurs, as in Brock and Hommes (1998). The model would then get an attrac-
tor consisting of two invariant circles around each of the two (unstable) period two-points, 
one lying above and the other one below the fundamental. Immediately after such a Hopf 
bifurcation, the price dynamics is either periodic or quasi-periodic, jumping back and forth 
between the two circles. The proof of this phenomenon is not straightforward due to the 
non-zero period points, although the 5-dimensional system (31) – (35) is still symmetric 
with respect to the origin. We shall thus demonstrate the occurrence of the Hopf bifurca-
tion and the emergence of the attractor numerically in the next section. 
3.4 Numerical Analysis
Our numerical analysis in the case of fundamentalists and contrarians will be con-
ducted for fixed values of parameters R = 1.1, k = 1.0, C = 1.0 and g = –1.5. We shall thus 
vary the intensity of choice parameter β and of course the memory strength parameter w. 
Four analytical tools will be used3; bifurcation diagrams, largest Lyapunov characteristic 
exponent (LCE) plots, phase plots, and time series plots. 
The dynamic behaviour of the system can first and foremost be determined by inve-
stigating bifurcation diagrams. In Figure 1 the bifurcation diagrams for two different va-
lues of the memory strength parameter are presented. We can observe that for low values 
of β we have a stable steady state, i.e. the fundamental steady state. As has been proven 
in Lemma 1, the position of this steady state, i.e. xeq = 0, is independent of the memory, 
which is clearly demonstrated by the simulations. For increasing β a (primary) period do-
3 However, we will not discuss these tools here in more detail, since they are fairly well-known; instead we will 
direct the interested reader to more detailed discussions in Arrowsmith and Place (1990), Shone (1997), and Brock 
and Hommes (1998).209
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ubling bifurcation occurs at β = β*; the steady state becomes unstable and a stable peri-
od two-cycle appears, as proven in Lemma 3. As can be seen from the simulations, this 
bifurcation value is also independent of the memory. The stability of the steady state is 
thus unaffected by the memory, as proven in Lemma 2.
If β increases further, indeed a (secondary) Hopf bifurcation occurs at β = β**, as 
has been claimed in Section 3.3; the period two-cycle becomes unstable and an attrac-
tor appears consisting of two invariant circles around each of the two (unstable) period 
two-points, one lying above and the other one below the fundamental. It is a supercritical 
Hopf bifurcation, where the steady state gradually changes either into an unstable equili-
brium or into an attractor (cf. Guckenheimer and Holmes, 1983; Frøyland, 1992; Kuznet-
sov, 1995). The position of the period two-cycle is independent of the memory, but it is 
not independent of the intensity of choice, as can be seen from expression . Numerical si-
mulations suggest that the secondary bifurcation value also does not vary with changing 
memory strength parameter w. For β > β** chaotic dynamic behaviour appears, which is 
interspersed with many (mostly higher order) stable cycles. Such a bifurcation route to 
chaos was also called the rational route to randomness (Brock and Hommes, 1997a), while 
the last part of it has been referred to as the breaking of an invariant circle. 
By examining largest Lyapunov characteristic exponent (LCE) plots of β we arrive 
at the same conclusions about the dynamic behaviour of the system. It can be seen from 
Figure 1 that the largest LCE is smaller than 0 and the system is thus stable until the pri-
mary bifurcation, which is independent of memory. At the bifurcation value, a qualitative 
change in dynamics occurs, i.e. a period doubling bifurcation and we obtain a stable peri-
od two-cycle. Largest LCE is again smaller than 0 and the system is thus stable until the 
secondary bifurcation. At this bifurcation value, again a qualitative change in dynamics 
occurs, i.e. a Hopf bifurcation, but the dynamics is more complicated. 
For lower values of w the largest LCE after β** is non-positive, but close to 0, which 
implies quasi-periodic dynamics. After some transient period the largest LCE becomes 
mainly positive with exceptions, which implies chaotic dynamics, interspersed with sta-
ble cycles. In fact, the largest LCE plot has a fractal structure (cf. Brock and Hommes, 
1998, p. 1258). In the case of w = 0.9 the global dynamics after β** immediately beco-
mes chaotic. Memory thus certainly affects the dynamics after the secondary bifurcati-
on. Since the latter is a period doubling bifurcation, we are talking about period doubling 
routes to chaos.
Next, we shall examine plots of the attractors in the (xt, xt–1) plane and in the (xt, n1,t) 
plane4 without noise and with IID noise added to the supply of risky shares. In the upper 
left plot of each of the four parts of Figures 2 and 3 we can first observe the appearance of 
an attractor for the intensity of choice beyond the secondary bifurcation value. The orbits 
converge on such an attractor consisting of two invariant ‘circles’ around each of the two 
(unstable) period two-points5, one lying above and the other one below the fundamental 
value. As the intensity of choice increases, the circles ‘move’ closer to each other. In the 
4 Attractors in the (xt, n2,t) plane are just flipped (rotated by 180 degrees) images of attractors in the (xt, n1,t) plane 
and will thus not be separately examined.
5 Though we are topologically speaking about circles, the actual shape of such an attractor can be quite diver-
se, as seen from the figures.210
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upper right and lower left plot of each of the four parts of Figures 2 and 3 we can observe 
that the system seems already to be close to having a homoclinic orbit. The stable mani-
fold of the fundamental steady state, , contains the vertical segment, xeq = 0, whereas the 
unstable manifold, , has two branches, one moving to the right and one to the left. Both 
of them are then ‘folding back’ close to the stable manifold.
For as Brock and Hommes (1998:1254) have proven for the asset pricing model 
without additional memory, at infinite intensity of choice and strong contrarians,
g < –R, that unstable manifold  is bounded and all orbits converge on the saddle point (0, 
–1). In particular, all points of the unstable manifold converge on (0, –1) and are thus also 
on the stable manifold. Consequently, the system has homoclinic orbits for infinite inten-
sity of choice. In the case of strong contrarians and high intensity of choice it is therefo-
re reasonable to expect that we will obtain a system close to having a homoclinic inter-
section between the stable and unstable manifolds of the fundamental steady state. This 
is indeed what can be observed from the lower left plot of each of the two parts of Figu-
Notes: Horizontal axis represents the intensity of choice (β). Vertical axis represents deviations of 
the price from the fundamental value (x) in the upper two diagrams and the value of the largest LCE in 
the lower two diagrams, respectively. The diagrams differ with respect to the memory strength parame-
ter w; the left one corresponds to w = 0.3, while the right one corresponds to w = 0.9.
Source: Author’s model of simulation
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res 2 and 3 and it suggests the occurrence of chaos for high intensity of choice. As can be 
seen from the lower right plot of each of the two parts of Figures 2 and 3, the addition of   
small dynamic noise to the system does not alter our findings. 
Again, we can observe that memory has an impact on the global dynamics of the sy-
stem. That is,  both the convergence of the system on an attractor consisting of two in-
variant ‘circles’ around each of the two unstable period two-points and the ‘moving’ of 
the circles closer to each other seem to be happening faster (at lower intensity of choi-
ce) when more memory is present in the model. Moreover, at the same intensity of choi-
ce we seem to be closer to obtaining a system that has a homoclinic intersection between 
the stable and unstable manifolds of the fundamental steady state when the memory str-
ength is higher. 
Finally, we shall examine time series plots of deviations of the price from the fun-
damental value and of the fraction of fundamentalists6. Figure 4 shows some time seri-
es corresponding to the attractors in Figures 2 and 3, with and without noise added to the 
supply of risky shares. Similarly to the findings of Brock and Hommes (1998), we can 
observe that the asset prices are characterized by an irregular switching between a stable 
6 Since the fraction of contrarians is just the unity complement of the fraction of fundamentalists, i.e. n1,t + n2,t = 






-0.7 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.5
Notes: Horizontal axis represents deviations of the price from the fundamental value (xt). Vertical 
axis represents lagged deviations of the price from the fundamental value (xt–1). The groups of four dia-
grams differ with respect to the memory strength parameter w; the left group corresponds to w = 0.3, 
while the right group corresponds to w = 0.9.
Source: Author’s model of simulation
Figure 2 Phase plots of (xt, xt–1) in case of fundamentalists versus contrarians
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phase with prices close to their (unstable) fundamental value and an unstable phase of up 
and down price fluctuations with increasing amplitude. 
This irregular switching is of course reflected in the fractions of fundamentalists and 
contrarians in the market. Namely, when the oscillations of the price around the unstable 
steady state gain sufficient momentum, it becomes profitable for the trader to follow effi-
cient market hypothesis fundamental value despite the costs that are involved in this stra-
tegy. The fraction of fundamentalists approaches unity and the asset price stabilizes. But 
then the nonzero costs of fundamentalists bring them into position where they are unable 
to compete in the market; the fraction of fundamentalists rapidly decreases to zero, while 
the fraction of contrarians with no costs approaches unity with equal speed. The higher the 
intensity of choice, ceteris paribus, the faster this transition is complete; when β approa-
ches the neoclassical limit, the entire mass of traders tends to use the best predictor with 
respect to costs, i.e. the strategy with the highest fitness.
Additional memory does not change the pattern of asset prices per se, but it does af-
fect its period. Namely, at the same intensity of choice and higher memory strength the 
period of this irregular cycle appears to be elongated on average, in such a way that the 
stable phase with prices close to their fundamental value lasts longer, while the durati-
on of the unstable phase of up and down price fluctuations does not change significantly. 
The effect of including more memory thus mainly appears to be stabilizing with regard to 
asset prices. With regard to fractions of different trader types we could say that including 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents deviations of the price from the fundamental value (xt). Vertical 
axis represents the fraction of fundamentalists (n1,t). The groups of four diagrams differ with respect to 
the memory strength parameter w; the left group corresponds to w = 0.3, while the right group corres-
ponds to w = 0.9.
Source: Author’s model of simulation
Figure 3 Phase plots of (xt, n1,t) in case of fundamentalists versus contrarians
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Notes: Horizontal axis represents the time (t). Vertical axis in each pair of time series plots first 
represents deviations of the price from the fundamental value (xt), and then the fraction of fundamen-
talists (n1,t). The plots on the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the figure differ with respect to 
the memory strength parameter w; the ones on the left correspond to w = 0.3, while the ones on the 
right to w = 0.9.
Source: Author’s model of simulation
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additional memory affects the transition from the short period of fundamentalists’ domi-
nance to the longer period of contrarians’ dominance in the market. This transition takes 
more time to complete at the same intensity of choice. More memory thus causes the tra-
ders to stick longer to the strategy that has been profitable in the past, but might not be so 
profitable in the recent periods. 
4 Fundamentalists versus Opposite Biased Beliefs 
The second case we are going to examine is a three-type heterogeneous agents model 
with fundamentalists and opposite biased beliefs as market participants. Fundamentalists 
again exhibit a deterministic function of the form: 
f1,t ≡ 0   (41)
though this time with no information gathering costs, i.e. C = 0. Biased beliefs exhibit 
deterministic functions:
f2,t = b2; b2 > 0,  (42)
f3,t = b3; b3 < 0,  (43)
for optimist and pessimist biases, respectively7. Biases also exhibit zero information gat-
hering costs. We have the following fractions of belief types equation:
. (44)




In order to analyze memory in our heterogeneous asset pricing model, we shall first 
determine the position and stability of the steady state, and then examine the possible qu-
alitative changes in dynamics; all in relation to the memory strength parameter. Then we 
shall perform some numerical simulations to combine global stability analysis with local 
stability analysis. 
7 In this paper we will mainly focus on the symmetric case.215
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4.1 Position of the Steady State
In our three-type heterogeneous agents model of fundamentalists versus biased beli-
efs, we shall again start by rewriting our system as a difference equation: 
Xt = F2 (Xt–1), (48)
where Xt-1 = (x1, t–1, x2,t–1, u1,t–1, u2,t–1, u3,t–1) is a vector of new variables, defined as: x1, t–1:= 
xt–1, x2,t–1 := xt–2, u1,t–1 := U1, t–2, u2,t–1 := U2, t–2 and u3,t–1 := U3,t–2.
We therefore obtain the following 5-dimensional first-order difference equation: 
, (49)




Our three-type heterogeneous agents model of fundamentalists versus biased beliefs 
in general can have the following steady state price deviations:
. (54)
We obtain the fundamental steady state for b2 = -b3 = b > 0 (opposite biased beli-
efs), where xeq = 0. This is implied by   when w ≠ 1, and consequently 
by  , originating from the rewritten expression (44).
By performing a generalization we can state the following lemma. 216
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Lemma 4: The fundamental steady state in the case of fundamentalists versus oppo-
site biased beliefs is a unique steady state of the system. Memory does not affect the po-
sition of this steady state. 
4.2 Stability of the Steady State and Bifurcations
The local stability of a steady state is again determined by the eigenvalues of the 
Jacobian matrix. At the fundamental steady state Xeq = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) the Jacobian matrix 
exhibits the characteristic equation that is in our case given by:
 (55)
which has the following three solutions, two of them being double: λ1 = 0, λ2,3 = w and
 
.
The fundamental steady state is stable for λ<1, which in our case is limited to the 
product of eigenvalues λ4,5 being smaller than one, i.e.  . In terms of the 
intensity of choice this happens for  , while in terms of the memory str-
ength this is guaranteed for  .
Thus we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 5: The fundamental steady state in case fundamentalists versus opposite bi-
ased beliefs is globally stable for  . Memory affects the stability of this 
steady state by restricting it to the given interval of the parameter value. 
If we now take a look at the eigenvalues λ4,5 of the characteristic equation (55), which 
are of interest in our case, we can observe that a saddle-node bifurcation would occur for: 
. (56)
This can never hold, since β ≥ 0 and the left-hand side is always non-negative, while   
and the right-hand side is always negative. On the other hand, a period doubling bifurca-
tion would occur for: 
. (57)217
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This can never hold either, since β ≥ 0 and the left-hand side is again always non-ne-
gative, while 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and the right-hand side is either negative or not defined.
The remaining qualitative change of the three discussed in Section 4.3 is the Hopf bi-
furcation. For this to occur, a complex conjugate pair of eigenvalues has to cross the unit 
circle. Eigenvalues λ4,5 are complex for  , 
which produces the following interval of values: 
. (58)
We therefore state the following lemma.
Lemma 6: There exists an intensity of choice value β* such that the fundamental ste-
ady state, which is stable for 0 ≤ β > β*, becomes unstable and remains such for β > β*. 
For   the system exhibits a Hopf bifurcation. Memory affects the emer-
gence of this bifurcation, viz. with more memory the bifurcation occurs later. 
As we have just established, in the case of fundamentalists versus opposite biased be-
liefs increasing intensity of choice to switch predictors destabilizes the fundamental steady 
state. This happens through a Hopf bifurcation. We can thus conclude, as did Brock and 
Hommes (1998) for the simpler version of the model, that in the presence of biased agents 
the first step towards complicated price fluctuations is different from that in the presence 
of contrarians. This fact does not change when we take memory into account.
4.3 Numerical Analysis
Our numerical analysis in the case of fundamentalists and opposite biased beliefs will 
be conducted for fixed values of parameters R = 1.1, k = 1.0, b2 = 0.2 and b3 = –0.2. We 
shall thus vary the memory strength parameter w and the intensity of choice parameter β. 
The same four analytical tools will be used than in Section 3.4.
Dynamic behaviour of the system can again first and foremost be determined by in-
vestigating bifurcation diagrams. From Figure 5 we can observe that for low values of 
β we have a stable steady state, i.e. the fundamental steady state. As has been proven in 
Lemma 4, the position of this steady state, i.e. xeq = 0, is independent of the memory, 
which is clearly demonstrated by the simulations. For increasing β a bifurcation occurs at
β = β*, which is a Hopf bifurcation; the steady state becomes unstable and an attractor 
appears, consisting of an invariant circle around the (unstable) steady state. It is again a 
supercritical Hopf bifurcation, where the steady state gradually changes either into an un-
stable equilibrium or into an attractor. 
The bifurcation value varies with changing memory strength parameter, as given by 
expression in Lemma 6. As can also be seen from Figure 5 at higher memory strength the 
bifurcation occurs later. For β > β* complex dynamical behaviour appears, which is in-
terspersed with stable cycles. As we have already discovered in Section 4.2, irrespective 218
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of the amount of additional memory that is taken into account such a (bifurcation) route 
to complicated dynamics is different from that in the presence of contrarians, where we 
observed period doubling route to chaos (rational route to randomness).
Notes: Horizontal axis represents the intensity of choice (b). Vertical axis represents deviations of 
the price from the fundamental value (x) in the upper two diagrams and the value of the largest LCE in 
the lower two diagrams, respectively. The diagrams differ with respect to the memory strength parame-
ter w; the left one corresponds to w = 0.3, while the right one corresponds to w = 0.9.
Source: Author’s model of simulation
Figure 5   Bifurcation diagrams and Largest LCE plots of b in case of fundamentalists 
versus opposite biased beliefs
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By examining largest Lyapunov characteristic exponent (LCE) plots of β we arrive 
at more precise conclusions about the dynamic behaviour of the system. It can be seen 
from Figure 5 that the largest LCE is smaller than 0 and the system is thus stable until 
the bifurcation. At the bifurcation value a qualitative change in dynamics occurs, i.e. a 
Hopf bifurcation. The dynamics is somewhat more complicated. Namely, we can obser-
ve that the largest LCE after β = β* is non-positive, but mainly close to 0, which implies 
periodic and quasi-periodic dynamics, i.e. for high values of the intensity of choice only 
regular (quasi-)periodic fluctuations around the unstable fundamental steady state occur. 
An important finding is that the predominating quasi-periodic dynamics does not seem to 
evolve to chaotic dynamics and the route to complex dynamics is indeed different from 
the routes examined so far. 219
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Next, we shall examine plots of the attractors in the planes, determined by (xt, xt–1) 
and (xt, n1,t). In the upper left plot of each of the two parts of Figure 6 we can first obser-
ve the appearance of an attractor for the intensity of choice beyond the bifurcation value. 
The orbits converge to such an attractor consisting of an invariant ‘circle’ around the (un-
stable) fundamental steady state. The attractor obtained in the (xt, n1,t) plane is somewhat 
different. Namely, the unstable steady state dissipates into numerous points and evolves 
into a ‘loop’ shape, as shown in Figure 7.
Notes: Horizontal axis represents deviations of the price from the fundamental value (xt). Vertical 
axis represents lagged deviations of the price from the fundamental value (xt–1). The groups of four dia-
grams differ with respect to the memory strength parameter w; the left group corresponds to w = 0.3, 
while the right group corresponds to w = 0.9.
Source: Author’s model of simulation
Figure 6 Phase plots of (xt, xt–1) in case of fundamentalists versus opposite biases
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As the intensity of choice increases, the dynamics remains periodic or quasi-periodic; 
in case of past deviations of prices from the fundamental value and fractions of biased 
beliefs the invariant circle slowly changes its shape into a ‘(full) square’ (see Figure 6), 
while in case of fractions of fundamentalists the loop slowly changes into a ‘three-sided 
square’ (see Figure 7). For high values of intensity of choice we seem to obtain (stable) 
higher period cycles; in the case of past deviations of prices from the fundamental value 
and fractions of biased beliefs we seem to attain a stable period four-cycle, while in the 
case of fractions of fundamentalists it is difficult to obtain any solid indications based so-
lely on numerical simulations due to convergence problems for very high values of inten-
sity of choice. In the latter case we can observe stable period four- and six-cycles, howe-
ver (see lower right plot of each of the two parts of Figure 7). Indeed, Brock and Hommes 
(1998) proved for the case of exactly opposite biased beliefs and infinite intensity of cho-220
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ice in their simpler version of the model without additional memory that the system has 
a stable four-cycle attracting all orbits, except for hairline cases converging on the unsta-
ble fundamental steady state. Additionally, they discovered that for all three trader types 
average profits along the four-cycle equal b2.
Notes: Horizontal axis represents deviations of the price from the fundamental value (xt). Vertical 
axis represents the fraction of fundamentalists (n1,t). The groups of four diagrams differ with respect to 
the memory strength parameter w; the left group corresponds to w = 0.3, while the right group corres-
ponds to w = 0.9.
Source: Author’s model of simulation
Figure 7 Phase plots of (xt, n1,t) in case of fundamentalists versus opposite biases
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Again, we can observe that the memory has an impact on the dynamics of the sy-
stem. Namely, both the convergence of the system on an attractor and the further deve-
lopment of such an attractor seem to be dependent on the value of the memory strength 
parameter. The precise impact of memory is somewhat more difficult to establish due to 
the dependence of the bifurcation value on memory strength and the subsequent need to 
choose higher intensities of choice with higher memory strength in order to demonstra-
te different nature of attractors of the system. However, we can still establish that at the 
same intensity of choice (after the bifurcation value) the system apparently needs less ad-
ditional memory in order to develop a specific stage of an attractor or even a (stable) hi-
gher period cycle.
Finally, we shall examine time series plots of deviations of the price from the funda-
mental value and of the fractions of all three types of traders. Figure 8 shows some time 
series corresponding to the attractors in Figures 6 and 7. We can observe that opposite 
biases may cause perpetual oscillations around the fundamental, even when there are no 
costs for fundamentalists, but can not lead to chaotic movements. Furthermore, as has 
already been indicated by the appearance of stable higher period cycles for high intensiti-221
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Figure 8   Time series of prices and fractions in case of fundamentalists versus opposite 
biases
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Notes: Horizontal axis represents the time (t). Vertical axis in each set of time series plots repre-
sents deviations of the price from the fundamental value (xt), and the fractions of fundamentalists (n1,t), 
optimistic biased beliefs (n2,t) and pessimistic biased beliefs (n3,t). The plots on the left-hand side and 
the right-hand side of the figure differ with respect to the memory strength parameter w; the ones on the 
left correspond to w = 0.3, while the ones on the right to w = 0.9.
Source: Author’s model of simulation
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es of choice, in a three-type world, even when there are no costs and memory is infinite, 
fundamentalist beliefs can not drive out opposite purely biased beliefs, when the intensi-
ty of choice to switch strategies is high.
Hence, according to  the argumentation of Brock and Hommes (1998, p. 1260), the 
market can protect a biased trader from his own folly if he is part of a group of traders 
whose biases are ‘balanced’ in the sense that they average out to zero over the set of types. 
Centralized market institutions can make it difficult for unbiased traders to prey on a set 
of biased traders provided they remain ‘balanced’ at zero. On the other hand, in a pit tra-
ding situation unbiased traders could learn which types are balanced and simply take the 
opposite side of the trade. In such situations biased traders would be eliminated, whereas 
a centralized trading institution could ‘protect’ them.
Additional memory does not change the pattern of asset prices and trader fractions 
per se, but it does affect its period. Namely, at the same intensity of choice and higher 
memory strength the period of these cycles appears to be elongated on average, in a way 
that both the negative and the positive deviation of the price from the fundamental value 
last longer. The same is valid for fractions ob biased traders, while in the case of fracti-
ons of fundamentalists the prolongation of the period of the irregular cycle appears in the 
form of less frequent ‘spikes’, which is understandable, since more persistent deviations 
of prices from the fundamental imply more space for biased traders and less chance for 
appearance of the fundamentalists. More memory causes the traders to stick longer to the 
strategy that has been profitable in the past, but might not be so profitable in the recent 
periods; therefore the system approaches purely quasi-periodic dynamics when the me-
mory strength increases at given intensity of choice. 
5 Concluding Remarks
In a market with fundamentalists and contrarians the fundamental steady state is the 
unique steady state of the system, which arises for low values of intensity of choice. Me-
mory affects neither the position of this steady state nor its stability. For increasing inten-
sity of choice a primary bifurcation, i.e. a period doubling bifurcation occurs; the steady 
state becomes unstable and a stable period two-cycle appears. Both the primary bifurca-
tion value and the position of the period two-cycle are independent of the memory. For 
further increasing intensity of choice a secondary bifurcation, i.e. a supercritical Hopf bi-
furcation, occurs; the period two-cycle becomes unstable and an attractor appears con-
sisting of two invariant circles around each of the two (unstable) period two-points, one 
lying above and the other one below the fundamental. For high intensity of choice chao-
tic asset price dynamics occurs, interspersed with many stable period cycles. Such a bi-
furcation route to chaos is often called the rational route to randomness.
In case of strong contrarians and high intensity of choice it is reasonable to expect that 
we will obtain a system that is close to having a homoclinic intersection between the sta-
ble and unstable manifolds of the fundamental steady state, which indicates the occurren-
ce of chaos. There exists a certain limited interval of memory strength values, for which 
at a given intensity of choice we are more likely to obtain such a system with more addi-
tional memory in the model. A rational choice between fundamentalists’ and contrarians’ 223
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beliefs triggers situations that do not reach fruition due to practical considerations and are 
thus unattainable, ‘castles in the air’, as Brock and Hommes (1998, p. 1258) would put it. 
As a consequence we obtain market instability, characterized by irregular up and down 
oscillations around the unstable efficient market hypothesis fundamental price. Additio-
nal memory lengthens on average the period of this irregular cycle and mainly appears to 
be stabilizing with regard to asset prices.
In a market with fundamentalists and opposite biases the fundamental steady state 
is also the unique steady state of the system, arising for low values of intensity of choi-
ce. Memory does not affect the position of this steady state, but does affect its stability. 
For increasing intensity of choice a supercritical Hopf bifurcation occurs; the steady state 
becomes unstable and an attractor appears. Memory affects the emergence of this bifur-
cation; the higher the memory strength, the higher the bifurcation value. More memory 
thus has a stabilizing effect on dynamics. For high intensity of choice the dynamic beha-
viour is more complex. However, irrespective of the amount of additional memory such 
a route to complicated dynamics is different from that in the presence of contrarians, for 
after the bifurcation value only regular (quasi-)periodic fluctuations around the unstable 
fundamental steady state occur. Consequently, an important finding is that the predomi-
nating quasi-periodic dynamics does not seem to evolve to chaotic dynamics. 
After the incidence of the bifurcation the higher value of the memory strength para-
meter causes the dynamics to be less periodic and more quasi-periodic; the dynamics the-
refore converges on purely quasi-periodic behaviour with increasing memory strength. 
Opposite biases may cause perpetual oscillations around the fundamental, even without 
costs for fundamentalists, but can not lead to chaotic movements. Furthermore, in a three-
type world, even when there are no costs and memory is infinite, fundamentalist beliefs 
can not drive out opposite purely biased beliefs, when the intensity of choice to switch 
strategies is high. Hence, following the argumentation of Brock and Hommes (1998, p. 
1260), the market can protect a biased trader from his own folly if he is part of a group of 
traders whose biases are balanced.
In conclusion, both our analytical work and our numerical simulations suggest that 
biases alone do not trigger chaotic asset price fluctuations. Sensitivity to initial states and 
irregular switching between different phases seem to be triggered by trend extrapolators; 
in our case by contrarians. Apparently, some (strong) trend extrapolator beliefs are needed, 
such as strong trend followers or strong contrarians, in order to trigger chaotic asset price 
fluctuations. A key feature of our heterogeneous beliefs model is that the irregular fluctu-
ations in asset prices are triggered by a rational choice in prediction strategies, based upon 
realized profits, viz. the observed deviations from the fundamentals are driven by short-
run profit seeking. We can also talk about rational animal spirits that, according to Brock 
and Hommes (1997b), exhibit some qualitative features of asset price fluctuations in the 
actual financial markets, such as the autocorrelation structure of prices and returns. 224
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Appendix: Proofs of the Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1 
Since g < 0   holds and expression   is always greater than 1. On 
the other hand, the value of the hyperbolic tangent function is by definition between –1 
and 1. In fact, since k > 0, g < 0, R > 1, C > 0 and the variable x is squared, the right-hand 
side of expression  is always between –1 and 0. Expression (29) thus never gives a solu-
tion and the fundamental steady state  is a unique steady state of the system. Since there 
is no memory strength parameter in expression (27) and thus also in expression (26), me-
mory does not affect the position of this steady state.
Proof of Lemma 2 
From the characteristic equation (36) we can observe three eigenvalues, where 
two of them are in fact double eigenvalues. The first eigenvalue assures stability when, 
, while the second and third (double) eigenvalue always assure stability. The 
fundamental steady state is stable for,  , but since   depends on other pa-
rameters of the system and g < 0, stability is (more conveniently) guaranteed at least for. 
Since the memory strength parameter is represented (only) by the third (double) eigen-
value, memory does not affect the stability of the steady state, as has been shown by the 
reduced system.
Proof of Lemma 3
For g < –2R it is clear from the expression for eigenvalue λ1 of the characteristic equ-
ation (36) that the fundamental steady state is unstable. Furthermore, since 0 < m* < 1, 
the expression   and (40) that {(x*, m*), (-x*, m*)} is a period two-cycle. Fi-
nally, for –2R < g < –R, the fundamental steady state is unstable and expression (40) has 
solutions ± x* if and only if  . Since the memory strength para-
meter does not affect the difference in fractions of belief types, memory does not affect 
the position of the period two-cycle.
Proof of Lemma 4
We will prove a more general result for the case with h = 1, …, H purely biased types 
bh (including fundamentalists with b1 = 0). Proceeding from the non-transformed varia-
bles the system is:
, (A1)227
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  (A2)
After subtracting off identical terms from the exponents of both numerator and deno-
minator in expression (A2) we obtain a new expression for the fractions: 
 
(A3)
where   is the fitness of trader type h, adjusted by subtracting off identical terms as 
above. The dynamic system defined by (A1) and (A3) is thus of the form: 
, (A4)
where the right-hand side function is defined as: 
. (A5)
Since it follows from (52) and (53) that  , steady states of 
expressions (A1) and (A3) or expression (A4) are determined by:
. (A6)
where r = R – 1. Since a steady state has to satisfy expression (A6), following Brock and 
Hommes (1998:1271), a straightforward computation shows that: 
, (A7)228
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where the inequality follows from the fact that the term between square brackets can be 
interpreted as the variance of the stochastic process, where each bh is drawn with proba-
bility nh. Therefore, x* Vβk (y) is increasing and Vβk (- rx*) decreasing in x*. It then follows 
from expression (A6) that the steady state x* has to be unique. From expression (A5) we 
obtain 
 
so that x* equals the fundamental steady state if and only if 
k b = 0 i.e. when all biases are exactly balanced. Since there is no memory strength para-
meter left in expressions (A6) and Vβk (0), memory does not affect the position of this ste-
ady state. It has to be mentioned though, that our derivation holds for finite intensity of 
choice, since fractions are only then all positive. 
Proof of Lemma 5
From the characteristic equation (55) we can observe five eigenvalues. The first 
three eigenvalues always assure stability, while the last two eigenvalues limit stabili-
ty. Given k > 0, b > 0, β ≥ 0, R > 1 and 0 ≤ w ≤ 1, the condition for stability in terms of β 
implies  . Similarly, the condition for stability in terms of w indicates 
. Memory therefore affects the stability of the steady state as shown. 
Proof of Lemma 6
When β increases, terms with β in the expressions for the eigenvalues λ4,5 increase as 
well, and one of the eigenvalues has to cross the unit circle at some critical β = β*. The 
fundamental steady state thus becomes unstable. Since it is obvious from the characteri-
stic equation (55) that for all β ≥ 0 we have g(1) > 0 and g (-1) < 0, a bifurcation has to 
occur. At the moment of the bifurcation the product of eigenvalues λ4,5 has to be equal one, 
i.e.  .
 
This happens either when we have two real eigenvalues with pro-
duct equal to one or a complex conjugate pair of eigenvalues. Since   
falls into the interval (58) for any given finite memory strength, we can conclude that for   
β = β* the eigenvalues have to be complex and thus a Hopf bifurcation occurs. Since the 
memory strength parameter is present in the expression for β*, memory affects the emer-
gence of this bifurcation; the higher the value of this parameter, the higher the bifurca-
tion value. 